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REPOI{TS OF CASES 
DETERMINED IN 
TT-]E SUPHEME COUH1' 
OF THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
[8. F. No. ]7642. In Bank. May 25, 1948.J 
WELLS FARGO RANK & UXTON TRUST CO., as Trustee, 
etc., Petitioner, Y. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
MARTN COUNTY, RespOlldent. 
[1] Trusts-Jurisdiction Over Trusts-Courts Sitting in Probate. 
-Under Prob. Cude, § 1120, . probntp court's 5uri~didioll 
over truots after a finnl decree of di;;tribution i~ limited to 
trust:; crea tel1 by will. 
P) Wills-Form-Incorporation of Other Writings by Reference. 
-The doctrine of incorporation in a will by referenCl' can-
not be :ll'plied without SOUle showing thnt the testator intended 
to incorporate th(' nontestamentary document into hi~ will. 
[3) Id.-Form-Incorporation of Other Writings by R,eference.-
It is not proper to apply tht' dortl'jllf' of ineorporatioll in a 
will by referente to a vnlid and opnative inlel'-t'il'oS trust 
when the trustor expres~('d an intention both in the "'ill :lnd 
in t.he trust instrument thn t it bp not intorporn ted in the 
will. 
[4] Trnsts-Jurisdiction Over Trusts-Courts Sitting in Probate. 
-It. is the duty of the prohnte conrt, on proceedings for 
distribution of a t('stalor';; estntp, to df>i ermine at the tillle of 
the decree the exisil'lIl'e lind v:dillity of any trust created by 
will and th" extent of any inter('st that (:ould pass to the 
t.rustee under thnt will. 
[3] May iw;trument illter-1Jil'OIl ol)(,l'nte also liS will, or part of 
will, not(', 45 A.L.R. 8-:!:J. Bel', al"o, ~(i Cal.Jur. 849. 
MeR. Dig. References: rl. 4. I), fl] Trnsts. ~ 11; [2] Will;;, ~ 183; 
[3] Will", ~ ]81; [0] Deceuents' E,,!alc,;, ~ 1051:); [7] l'rusL:;, § 107; 
[8J Trust~. § 104. 
12 C.2d-J (1) 
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11i\ Ie!. .Juri~dicti()n Over TTllf;1.~: C(lurt.f; flitting ill Probate.--
111 ')"if'l'lllinin:,:' \\'h.'I1,"<!' a i"'r~oll if' ho),lill h all intert'st in 
propt'J'ty ns tJ'lI~t('t' or :, trllst "l'l'lited hy will 01' as a tru~t"e 
of an infer-vivos tl'lI~t, it is !I,l' dut.) of the prot:tle rourt. on 
proceedings for di~trihntion of the testntol"s estllte, to in-
terpret th(' will and tu determine whether the illter-vilw8 trust 
agl'epment was part of 1 he will; ani! a determination that thf> 
trust was created by intl'r-vil1oS agreement precludf>s cun-
sideration of the question of the validity of' that trust IlR a 
testamentary trust and the effect of Prob. Code, § 41, on the 
property that had been transferred by the trustor before his 
death. 
[6] Decedents' Estates-Distribution-Effect of Decree-Matters 
Determined-Construction of Trusts.-A decree of distribu-
tion, designating a trust as an existing inter-vivos trust and 
failing to specify tIle beneficiaries, purposes or disposition 
of the assets distributed to it, is "conclusive as to the rights 
of heirs, devisees and legatees" (Prob. Code, § 11)21) and, as 
a devisee and legatee, the trustee is bound by the decree with 
respect to the existence, validity of and rights under any 
testamentary trust. 
[7] Trusts-Construction and Operation.-It was evident from a 
trust agreclIlent and a will that the trustor intended the trust 
created by him to be a single trust administered as one unit 
rather than as two trusts administered as two units, where the 
trust agrecment provided thnt "upon my death the entire net 
incomc from said trust as establishec by me in my lifetime, 
or increased by me, under the provisions of my will, be paid 
over annually," to designated persons, and where the will 
evideneed the same intent by providing therein for an addi-
tion to the assets of the trust. 
[8] ld.-Construction and Operation.-The question whether the 
trustor has created one trust or Dlore than one trust depen:ls 
primarily on the expressions of his intention in the trust 
instruments. 
[9] ld.-Jurisdiction Over Trusts-Courts Sitting in Probate.-
The court sitting in probate properly d,>clined to hear and 
determine a petition, after decree of distrihntion, to cunfirm a 
trustee's sale where the trust, as determined in such decree, was 
an infer-vivos trust, to whi('h assets w('rc adtled by the trustor's 
will with the intent, clearly expressed both in the will sn.! 
the trust agreemcnt, that the trust was to be ndministered 
as a single unit. The trustee's remedy under such circum-
stances was to seek relif>f in a court of <>qnit.y having juris-
diction to settle the entire controversy. 
\ 
/ 
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pj;OCEEDING in mandamus to compel a slqwrior (,Ol1rt 
to ileal' al1d dC'tC'rmine a petition for confirmation of a trllstC'e's 
sale of nil i1J1('rc~t ill real proprrty. Writ denied. 
Helll'r, EIll'lnan, White & McAuliffe, Casper W. Wein-
herger and A J. Treat for Petitioner. 
Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges and Gordon Johnson 
for Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J.-Petitioner as trustee of a trust known as 
the "Robbins Foundation" has petitioned this court for a 
writ of mandamus to compel respondent court, sitting as a 
probate court, to hear and determine a petition for an ordcr 
confirming the sale of an interest in certain land that was 
distributed to the trustee under the will of Frederick Averill 
Robbins. The question before tbis court is whether the pro-
bate court has jurisdiction to hear the petition for confirma-
tion of the sale of this interest in the land. 
In 1916, Frederick Averill Robbins transferred certain 
property in trust to the Union Trust Company of San Fran-
cisco, predecessor of the 'Yells Fargo Bank and Union Trust 
Company. by a trust agreement under the terms of which the 
trustee was to use the income from the property to establish 
scholarships for certain students of the mechanical arts. 
The trust instrument provides that" The property constitut-
ing said fund shall be invested and reinvested by my trustee 
as in its discretion may seem to be for the best interests 
thereof ... and my trustee shall also have full power and 
anthority, subject only to confirmation of court, to sell the 
property composing said trust or fund. . .. " 
The trustor reserved the power of modification, and he 
made several modifications providing for the use of the in-
come for certain charitable purposes, including the payment 
of part of the income to the "Board of Governors, Shriners 
Hospital for Crippled Children at San Francisco." Under 
th(' terms of the trust as last amended on March 6, 1931, the 
trnst was to be known as the" Robbins Foundation," and the 
W ells Fargo BanI, was named trustee. The trustor also 
directed in the 1931 amendment that "upon my death the 
entire net income from said trust as established byme in my 
lifetime, or increased by me, under the provisions of my 
Will, b(' paid over annually to the Board of Governors, 
Shril1ers Hospital for Crippled Children at San Francisco." 
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On the samc day, the trustor also cxrcuteu a will in whicll 
he limned the Wells Fargo Bank as executor and 11'ft crrtain 
property to the bank as trustee for two othcr charitable 
trusts, one for the benefit of the First Presbyterian Church 
of Sausalito and the othcr for the benefit of the \Vomen'8 
Club of Sausalito. In aduition the will provided for a bequest 
to the Wells Fargo Bank as trustee of the "Robbins Founda-
tion" of an amount sufficient to increase the corpus of that 
trust to $200,000. After the death of the trustor, this will 
was aumittE'd to probate and on January 26, 1934, an amended 
uecrec of distribution was fileu uistributilll:,! ccrtaill real uncI 
pcrsolla1 property, illcludiug the laud involved iu the present 
proceeding, as follows; 
"To the WELLS FARGO BANK & UNION TRUST 00., a cor-
poration, as Trustee under a certain trust created by FRED-
ERICK A. RORBINS during his lifetime and now designated a" 
the ROnnINg FOUND.\T!ON ... an undivided interest <:qnal 
to 54.S2B/;' .... 
"To the \VELLl:> FARGO BANK & UNION 'fRUST CO., a cor-
poration, as 'frustee for the uses and purposes in paragraph 
'l'lllHTEENTH of said Will . . . an undiviueu interest . . . 
eqnal to 30.115% thereof, to have and to hold the same for 
the blmefit of the Trustees of the First Presbyterian Chnrch 
of Sau~alito, Marin County, California; to invest aud re-
invest, or exchange ... with full power and authority during 
the continuance of the trust to sell or exchange any part or 
portioll of the securities at any time composing said fund .... 
"To the "WELLS FARGO B..\.1\"X & UNION TRUST Co., a cor-
poration, as Trustee for the uses and purposes hereinafter 
set forth ... an undivided interest ... equal to 15.057% 
thereof, to have and to hold the same in trust for the uses and 
purposes as follows: 
"To invest and reinvest, or exchange, ... with full power 
and authority during the continuance of this trust to sell or 
exchange any part or portion of the securities at any timc 
composing said fund ... and to dispose of and distribute 
said trust fund and the proceeds thereof... to the 
""OMEN'S CLUB OF SAUSALITO" for certain specified purposes. 
On November 19, 1946, petitioner, "as trustee of the trusts 
creatcd by the last will and testament of l<'rederick Averil! 
Robbins" filed in respondent court a report of sale and a 
petition for an order confirming the sale of the rea) property 
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frustp(' lind"" ~('(·till\l 1120 of (II(' 1'1'011.11,' I:od(', In l11P r('-
port of sa'" illid petition for l'Ol1n)'llialioll IIII'}''''!!' i1 \\';IS aI-
leg'PII tlial till' propprly had bpl'li "old L~' til(' pptit iOIl<'r, as 
tru~:tp(' of till' three trusts, ":mbjeC'1 to tlH' {'onfirmation of 
Court." TIJ(' trustee alll'/!rd ill tile petition for in"truetions 
tlJ:lt Iii,' trllstl~e wus IIIH'I'rlain \l"lielll1'r tlndel' tht' tE-rlllo.; of 
tll!' dr('j"{'{' uf di~lributioll with rl's)ll'l'1 to tIl/' tl·tI:<h for 1 Ill' 
LelleDt of till' \YollJell'~ Club <llld tllr' l'r('shytl'riall ('IIlIl'e11 
the trllstl'l' had power to sell tIll' r('al property, Till' cuurt 
Iwaru thl' I'etitiou for instructioJls awl uett'I'IJJi1J<.'d that pc-
titionel' as trlble(' of the \Volllcn's 01 ub I l'U~t and the Prt'shy-
tE-rian Church trust had power to sell the interest of said 
trusts in the real property pursuant to thc decree of distribu-
tion without confirmation of sale by the court. 'I'he cllurt, 
):owe\,er, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the petition for 
an order eon firming the sale of the interest of the "Robbins 
F'ollnllation," on the ground that the foundation is not a 
trust created by will. 
[1] Probate Code, section 1120 provides that "When 
CI trust created by will continues after distribution, thE- su-
pt·rior court shall not lose jurisdiction of the estate by final 
distribution, but shall retain jurisdiction for the purpose of 
dd\3rmining to whom the property shall pass and be delivered 
upon final or partial termination of the trust, to the extent 
that such determination is not concluded by the decree of 
di:;;tributioIl, of settling the accounts and passing upon the 
acts of the trustee and for the other purposes hereinafter set 
forth," (Italics added.) Although the probate c. urt has 
broad powers under this section over the acts of the trustee 
of a trust created by will (sec Estate of Smith, 4 Cal.App.2d 
548, 552 [41 P.2d 565] ; Estate of Smead, 12 Cal.2d 20, 24 
[82 P .2d 182]), its jurisdiction over trusts after distribution 
is limited to trusts created by will. Except for the statute, 
thl superior court, sitting as a probate court, would haw no 
jurisdiction over trusts after the final decree of distribution 
(Estate of McLellan, 8 Ca1.2d 49, 55-56 l63 P.2d 1120]), and 
the Rtatute provides for such jurisdiction only when tlit' 
trust has been created by will. The question arises therefore 
wlwthcr the petitioner as trustee of the .. Hobbins Founda-
tioJi " held the interest distributed to it for the benefit of the 
foundatioll as a trllster of a trust created by will or as a 
trustee of Ull inter-t:it'lJ~ tru~t. 
) 
) 
Jurisdiction of the probate ('Olll't ()"er the sale of this in-
terest in the renl property canllot be sll~taine(l on either of 
the two theories advanced: (1) that the whole of the "Robbins 
Foundation" trust was illeorporateJ by reh'renee into the 
will and thus after the trl1::;to1' 's <tvat h b{'came a trust created 
by will; or (2) that the pruperty distributed to the trustee 
of the "Robbins Foulldatioll" under the trustor's will con-
stitutes the corpus of a testamentary trust separate from the 
"Robbins Foundation" trust cl'eated by inter-vivos agree-
ment. 
[2] In regard to the first theory, the question is not 
whether such an incorporation would be valid (S('e Estate of 
Willey, 128 Cal. 1, 8 [60 P. 471] ; cases collected 4G A.L.R. 
843; 21 Corncll L. Q. 492), for that question, if pertinent, 
should have been determined during the probate proceeding. 
Thc questioll is whether thc will or the decree of distribution 
provided for such an incorporation. The doctrine of in-
corporation by reference canllot be applied without some 
showing that the testator intended to illcorporah' the non-
testamentary document into his will. (In re McCurdy's 
Estate, 197 Cal. 276, 285 [240 P. 498] ; see, 1 Page on 'Vills, 
§ 263; Atkinson on Wills, p. 336.) III carrying ont the gen-
eral intention of the testator and the policy of the law against 
intestacy (see Prob. Code. ~] 0:2) some courts interpret a 
reference to nontestamentan' documents as indicative of an 
intention to incorporate by reference certain otherwise in-
operative nontestamentary instruments into the testator's 
will. (An'ingtoll v. Brown, 235 Ala. 196 [178 So. 218, 220] ; 
Estate of Dimmitt, 141 Neb. 413, 425 [3 N.W.2d 752, 144 
A.L.R. 704, 717], 41 Mich.L.Rev. 751, 752.) No problem 
of invalidity or intestacy, however, is presented in the present 
case, and there is no reason for applying the doctrine of in-
corporation by reference in the absence of some showing that 
it would be in accord with the testator's intention. In many 
cases the trustor of an express trust may deem it inexpedient 
to incorporate the whole trust into his will. The trustor in 
the present case, for example, may have been advised that 
"The incorporation in a will of the terms of an independent 
trust is {'ntirely gratuitous and lDay result in throwing the 
corpus of the trust into the general estate disposed of by the 
will, thereby unnecessarily subjecting the corpus of the trust 
to administration under the will with attendant administra-
tion costs and o.i.torney's fees •••• " (Rappoport, Integrat-
) 
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ing Jnsttnmrutf!of Disposition, 78 Trusts and Estates 571, 
577.) 
[3] It is neither necessary nor proppr to apply the doc-
trine of il1l'orporatioll h~' reference to a valid and opf'rative 
inter-vit,us trust when the trustor, as in the pres(,lIt l'Hse, ex-
pres;..ed no intention ill the will or in the il1icr-lJiv()$ trust 
instru111ent that tLe latt('r be incorporated illtu the will. The 
expressed intention of the trustor in both uoculllellts was 
contrary to the theory that he intended to incorporate the 
trust into his will. He provided ill the 193] amendment to 
the inter-vivos trust, on the same day that he exeeuted his last 
will, for the disposition of the income from the "Robbins 
}'oundation" trust, "as established by me in my lifetime or 
increased by lllE: under the provision of ttty will." (Italics 
ad<.led.) J Il his will he provided as follows: 
"During my lifetime I have estahlished a certain trust 
fund ... now designated as 'ROBBl!'lS FOUNDATION.' Said 
trust fund and the earnings thereof ure to be used by the 
said WELLS FARGO BANK &. UNION TRUST CO. Ol~ SAN FRAN-
CISCO, n corporation, the trustee herein named, for certain llses 
and benefit.s ill the declaration of trust estnblishillg the same 
designated. It is my PllrlJose and intent that tkr. curj'US of 
said [lind be in amount Two HUNDRED THOUSAND ($2U/),000.00) 
DOLLARS, and I hereby bfjqtteafk a sufficient amount of my 
estate to make up the difJe"encf; between said SlllU of $200,-
000.00 and the value at the tim~ of my death of all securities 
and properties which, in lily lifetime, I ll1ay hnvc ~ct-over 
und placed in said fund." (Itnlics added.) 
Any doubt that might remain as to the intention of the 
trustor us expressed in his will, has been resolved by the pro-
bate conrt in its amended fiunl decree of distribution wherein 
tllt' court ordered that. there be distributed to "the WELLS 
FARGO BANK &, UNION TRus'r CO., a corpor~tion, ns Trustee 
under n certain trust create,] by FREDERICK A. ROBBIN::; during 
his lifetime /lnd now designated as the R.oBBINS FOUNDATION 
the Sllm of $38,557.60 in cash and also an undivided int.erest 
equal to 54.828% of the other assets of the estate hereafter 
more particularly described and inventoried [including the 
land in question]." (Italics added.) Moreover, the decree 
di_~ not dcscribe the bcneficiary of the trust, the purpose of 
the trust or the disposition of the foregoing assets nft.cr their 
uis1riuntion to the trustee, but with respect to the trusts 
clt'urly created by will, the dl'l'l"l'l' :;pecifies the bcm'ficiaries 
) 
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of tl](' trusts, the trust purposes, Ull<] the disposition of the 
assets (listrilmt('u to the trush'(>. 
[4] Petitioner contenus that there was 110 reason for the 
probate court to det el'll1iue at the tilJleof tIll' (lL'crN' of dis-
tributioll whrtl)(>r or not the trust was inter-vivus or h'Rta· 
meutary in character and that thereforr the decre\' should 
not be cOllsidel'\'(l (]etermillative of this issue. It was the dlIty 
of tIlt, probate l"ourt, however, to determine at the tillle of 
the deeree of uistriblltioll tlJC existence anu validity of all~' 
trust createu by will and the extent of any interest that 
could pass to the trustee 1I1lder that will. . (Oook v. Ouok, 17 
Ca1.2d 639, 652 [111 P.2<1 322] j Estate of Lorin[J, 2!J Ca1.2d 
423,427 [175 P.2d 524] j Estate orEaster, 24 Cal.2d 191,194 
[148 P.2d 601].) At the time of the decree the probate court 
must distribute the estate "to the persons entitled thereto" 
(Prob. Code, ~ 1020) and jJl the decree it "must llaUle the 
persons and the proportions or parts to which each is en-
titled .... " (Prob. Code, § 1021.) [5] To determine the 
persons entitled to distribution and the extent of their in-
terests it was the duty of the probate court to interpret tIlE' 
will and determine whether the into'-vivos trust agreement 
was part of the will. If it had determined that the infer-
vivos trust agreement was intended t.o be incorporated into 
the will and that the wholr trnst was thus created by the will, 
it would have been ne(~essary for the court to d(·termine the 
validity of that trust as a testamentary trust and the effect, 
if any, of section 41 of the Probate Code on the property 
that had been transferred by the trustor before his death. 
(Estote of Loring, 29 Ca1.2d 423, 431 [175 P.2d 524] j see 
Rutherford v. Ott, 37 Cal.App. 47, 51 [173 P. 4901.) By 
determining that the trust was created by inter-vivos agree-
ment, it preduded consideration of that question to the extent 
that the property had been transferred by the trustor under· 
tIl(' inter-vivos agreement. The court was concerned primarily 
with the questions of the identification of the distributl'f' and 
the capacity of the distributc'e to take under the will. (S<'e 
Swetland ". Swetland, 102 N.J.Eq. 294, 297 [140 A_ 279J j 
In ,-e Rausch's Will, 258 N.Y. 327, 331 [179 N.E. 755, 80 
A.L.R. 981.) 
[6] It is apparellt that the probate court did consider 
the qnestion of th(· l1atll1'(' of the "Robbins Foundation" 
trust and fOllnd that it was all inter-vivos trnst and that it 
was unnecessary to cOllsider thl' validity and plirpos('s of the 
May]948] WELLS FARGO BK. J,;TC. CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
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trust, for, as already has been observed, the decree designates 
t he trust as an existing i Iller-vivos trust and fails to specify 
the twncficinries, purposes. or disposition of th(' assets dis-
tributed to it, although those matters are spreified in detail 
in the decree with respect to the two charitable trusts that 
were created by will. This decree is, therefore, "conclusive 
as to the rights of heirs, devisees and legatees" (Prob. Code, 
§ 1021) and, as a devisee and legatee the trustee is clearly 
bound by the decree with respect to the "existence, validity 
of and rights under any testamentary trust, and the incidental 
matters which necessarily are involved in a determination on 
those subjects .... " (Cook v. Cook, supra, 17 Ca1.2d at 
652; see also Estate of Loring, supra, 29 Ca1.2d at 431; Estate 
of Easter, supra, 24 Cal.2d at 194.) 
The other theory on which the petitioner relies to show 
jurisdiction in the probate court is that the property dis-
tributed to the trustee of the "Robbins Foundation" con-
stitutes the corpus of a separate testamentary trust and, as 
such, is a trust created by will within the purview of section 
1120 of the Probate Code. Respondent '8 contention is that 
the will and decree of distribution provide for Ii testamentary 
transfer of certain property to an already existing inter-vivos 
trust and that the whole of the .. Robbins Foundation" is 
therefore one trust to be administered as a unit. 
Ordinarily, when a trustor of an intt!r-vivos trust 
provides in the trust instrnmf'nt for additions to the trust 
by will and provides in his will for a gift to the trust, his 
intention is to authorize the trustee "to deal with the whole 
property as a unit. The only possible difficulty would arise 
in states in which different conrts haw jurisdiction over tes-
tamentary trusts and trusts created inter-vivos. At common 
law, howeyer, a court of equity had jurisdiction over all 
trusts, and in many states today courts of probate are given 
jurisdiction over both kinds of trust.:;." (1 Scott on Trusts 
p. 293.) In those states in which testamentary and inter-vivo! 
trusts are subject to the jurisdiction of different courts, there 
is no clear authority on the qnestion of whether one or both 
have jurisdiction over this type of trust; however, "such 
meagre anthority as exists points to equity, rather than pro· 
bate, as the forum having jurisdiction over the combined 
fund." (1 Nossaman. Trust Administration and Taxation, 
pp. 603, 105, citing the unreported case of N ew York Trust 
) 
J 
Co. v. Rausch, decided by t!le New York Supreme Court in 
1938.) 
[7] In the present case it is e,·ident from the trust agree-
ment and the will that the t.r'lsh1r iutended the "Robbins 
Foundation" to be a single trust administered as one unit 
rather than as two trusts administered as two units. He pro, 
video in the 1931 awelldluellt tu tlte inter-v'illOs trust agree· 
ment that "upon my df-ath the ('1:1 :re net income frow said 
trust as established by mc hi wy lifctir.le, or increased by 
IDe, uuder tIle provislons of my Will, k paid over annually 
to the Board of Governors, SLrim'rs Hospital for Crippled 
ChiMren at Sun Ij'rnncisl~o." '!'Lc will evinces the same in-
tent, fllr the trustor t!1er~ provided that "It is my purpose 
au.! iIttent tJIat the corpus of said fnnd be in amount Two 
HUNDRED TH,lUSAND ($2'JO,000.1)0) D(lLLARS, and I hereby 
be'jlll'ath a suffil'ieut. nnlll:mt of JOy E'st.ate to make up the 
difference .... " r.l'he decree' of distribution likewise in-
dicates that at the time c:f the decree the probate court de-
termille!l 1..'at the property ~houldbe distribnted to the 
trustee of tbe fouudatioll to be administered as a single trust, 
for the propE'rty in que~thn Wfl.S distributed to "the WELLS 
:F'ARGO BANK & UNION r.l'RUS'l' CO., a corporation, as Trustee 
under a certli:ll trust creat.ed by FREDERICK A. ROBBINS during 
his lifl'timc." 
[8] '1'be clnestioll wh~ther the trustor has created one 
trust or J!lore thau line trnst depends primarily on the ex-
pressiOllS of his inteution in tbe t.rust instruments. (Hunt-
ington Not. Banlc v. Commissioners, 90 F.2d b76, 878; U. 8. 
Pr'ust 00. v. Oommissioner, 2!JG U.S. 481, 487 [56 S.Ct. 329, 
80 L.E,l. 340] ; Parkhurst v. Ginn, 228 Mass. 159, 166 [117 
N.E. 2U21 ; Industrial ~l'rust Cu. v. Har1'ison, 67 R. I. 131, 146 
[21 A.2tl 254, 135 A.L.R. 1312] ; cases collected 102 A.L.R. 
257 involV!llg application of federal income tax; see also 40 
Columb.L.Rev. 309, 310-311.) The question remains, however, 
whether there is some established principle of law or reason 
of policy that would justify tbis court inl'egarding the "Rob-
bins Foundation" as consisting of two trusts, regardless of 
the intention (If the trustor. Petitioner has not referred to 
any principle of law tbat prevents a trustor of an inter-vivos 
trust from increasing the corpus of the trust by, bequeathing 
or devising pruperty for that purpose in his will. At least 
two jurisUictions that have not accepted the doctrine of in-
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inter-vivos trusts as a valid met.bod of iucreasing an established 
trust. In SWCllflllU v. Swetland, 102 N.J .Eq. 294, 296-297 
1140 A. 27!)], the New Jersey court. held that SUell a !rift 
was yaliu "regardless of what the rule is in New J ersl'Y with 
respect to the uoctrine of incorporation by reference .... 
By it tlw testator merely added additional property to 1\ 
trust fuuu cstauli:;Led by him years before the execution of 
his will uuder u valiu, active trust. . . . 'l'he trust to which 
this bequest is auded is not theoret.ieal, nebulous, intangible 
or incapable of ideutification, but exists in fact, and thl' 
trustcl'-ll'gate" is as distinct and definite an entity as would 
hnve be.~n an individual or corporation legatee." The New 
York Court of Appeals in In n Rausch's Will, 258 N.Y. 327, 
330-331 [17!) N.E. 755, 80 A.L.R. 98], involving a similar 
additioll to the corpus of an inter-vivos trust by will, held that 
"at tlk execution of this will there was in existence a valid 
~t"t"(~ (,f trllst whereby n trustee was under a duty to appl~· 
tb" subject-matter of the grant to uses there declared. All 
thal the later will does is to I!ive addit.ional property to the 
same trustee to be belu in the sallJe way .... A gift to a 
trust company as trustee of a trust ereated by a particular 
(ked iuentifies the trnst in describing the trustee, like a gift 
it. a corporation for tbt: nses sta.ted in its charter .... The 
l('gaey whell givp.n was not thl' declaration of a trust, but 
the enlargement of the subject-matter of a trust declared 
nlr('a,ly." 'l'his rule, applicable where the doctrine of in-
,·ol"porat.ion by reference is not accepted, applies for the same 
r('a~OllS to a gift to an existing trust that the trustor did not 
int('nd to incorporatp into his will. 
~o reason of policy has been suggested why this court should 
I"l'gl11"(l the foundation a~ two separate trusts c'lntrary to the 
,·xpressel} intentiou of the trustor. [9] Petitione:- contends 
t hat since thc two other charitable trusts referred to in the 
will are clearly testamentary trusts "the probate court alone 
has jurisdictiOl~ over the8e two latter trusts" and an "anoma-
lOllS situation would arise if the Robbins Foundation trust 
is held to he inter-vivos aud out!'licle the jurisdiction of the 
probate court, for then 55~( of the Robbins house will be 
ullLit'r tlw jurisdiction of the Superior Caurt in the exercise of 
its ~l'nd'al eqnitaiJk jurisdiction while 45% of the same bouse 
·,,·ill bl' llndC'r til!' jurisdietion of the pr!)bate court." The 
!:ollh'ntioll t.llat the probate court alolle has jurisdietion of tlH' 
h'>;t aJlIl!l1tary trmits wouhl c{·rtainly not support a decision 
\ ) 
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holding the fouJI(lation to be two scpal'ate trusts, one inter-
1:iv{Js :md tllC other telitamclltary, for if tbi;, contl'l1tion is 
sound, all anomalous situatioll would arise with rCSpt!ct to 
the future adu~inistratioll of thc foundation, with part of its 
asset!'. subject to the jurisdietion of OlIC court alld part sub-
ject to another. If the trustec should fail to kecp th!' assets 
separate it would apparently be nl'Ct'SSll ry for thc 1 rustee to 
seek tlw approval of two courts every time it sought to exer-
cise its power of sale with respect t,., those assets. Thl~ trustor 
clearly did not intend such result in creating the Robbins 
Foundation or in providing in his will for an addition to its 
asset.."I. 
In nny cvtmt, petitioner's contention is without nwrit, for 
the probate court was not the only court that could have 
jurisdictioll to approve or di"lapprove thl' entire transaction. 
Sincl' the jurisdiction over trusts confl!rrl;d on a court sitting 
as a "onrt l)f probate iN limited to tl.'stamp.ntary trnsts. and 
th .. juril,Jidioll of a court haying ~eneral ':qllity p. "'Vers is 
mucr. broader, petitioner's remedy under the circumstances 
was to seek relief in a court of equity having jurisdiction to 
settle the entire controversy. In the absence of Probate Code, 
section 1120 all trusts, after distributi< n, would be subject 
to the jurisdiction of the superior court, not sitting as a court 
of probate (Estate of 111 cLellan, supra, 8 Ca1.2d 49, 55-56) 
and that court, at least, retains residual jurisdiction over 
trusts not within the jurisdiction of a probate court. Whether 
or not in a situation involving testamentary'trusts alone, the 
jurisdiction ,. conferred on the court siWng in probate by 
section 1120, Probate Code, supra, is exclusive or is concurrent 
with the exercise of jurisdiction sitting in equity" (Willson v. 
Security First-Nat. Bank, 21 Ca1.2d 705, 712 [134 P .2d 800], 
collecting cases; see also, Dowdall v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. 
348,353 [191 P. 685].), where the probate court lacks juris-
diction to determine an issue involving both testamentary 
and nontestamentary trusts, it is proper "for the snperior 
court not sitting in probate to take jurisdiction of it and 
fully determine the controversy." (McCaughna v. Bilhorn, 
10 Cal.App.2d 674, 684 [52 P.2d 10251; see also Howard v. 
Bennett. 53 Cal.App.2d 546, 548 [127 P.2d 1012].) 
The petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus is denied 
and the alternative writ is discharged. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J .. Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer. 
J,/ aud Spence, J., cOllcurred. 
